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In his dystopian science fiction novel, Brave New World, Aldous
Huxley depicts a not-too-distant society where the state has taken
over all stages of child rearing.1 With malignant paternalism, the state
controls reproduction (achieved in test tubes on a conveyer belt) and
the teaching and "nurturing" of children (using heavy-handed, brain-
molding techniques to press children into assigned social castes).2
The specter of an all-devouring state replacing the natural role of
parents has recently become the rallying cry of a number of conserva-
tive, mainly Christian, groups nationally.3 These advocates complain
that despite early Supreme Court pronouncements supporting par-
ents' power over their children, many lower courts have refused to
treat parenting as a constitutionally protected right. As a result, they
claim, state intervention in parental decisions is increasing.4 Cathy
Cleaver, Director of Legal Studies for the Family Research Council,
echoes many in the movement in her assessment: "We've ushered in a
new age where children who don't want to obey their parents can do
* J.D. Candidate, Hastings College of the Law, 1997; B.A. Oberlin College, 1990.
1. ALDous HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1946).
2. Id.
3. These groups include the increasingly influential Christian Coalition (led by Pat
Robertson and Ralph Reed) and organizations specificaly premised on parental rights,
such as Of the People (led by economist Jeffrey Bell) as well as rightist think-tanks such as
the Heritage Foundation. See Charles Levendosky, Parental Rights Bill Protects Parental
Wrongs; Broad Law Would Leave Children Exposed to Abuse, DAYTON DAILY NEWS,
Sept. 4, 1996, at All.
4. See e.g., Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 1946
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995) (statement of Greg D. Erken, Executive Director, Of the People).
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what they want, and when the government can overrule what a parent
thinks is best. It's time to turn that around."5
In response to this perceived threat, advocates have organized
what has been called the "parental rights movement." This movement
is quickly gathering momentum both in the political and legal arenas.6
In addition to continuing legal challenges, parental rights advocates
have introduced constitutional amendments and other bills in twenty-
eight states,7 as well as a bill in Congress called the "Parental Rights
and Responsibilities Act"8 (PRRA), all designed to ensure a funda-
mental right of parents to control the upbringing of their children. In-
terestingly, none of these proposed changes is explicitly related to
parents' religious rights or beliefs, though they are being championed
by religious organizations and it is clear that many of the issues in-
volved in parental control implicate religious beliefs.
At the same time, a number of scholars have suggested that the
state be accorded a very active part in the rearing of children, and that
parents be relegated to the role of "licensees" or stewards in service of
their children's needs.9 These scholars contend that the recognition of
parental rights inevitably damages the interests of children and denies
them their own fundamental rights.
Clearly, there are many consequences of recognizing (or reviving)
a fundamental right of parenting as a non-religiously based constitu-
tional right.'0 Such recognition could bring profound change in such
diverse areas of the law as parental authority over children's medical
treatment, abortion, birth control, sex education, and home school-
5. Rachel L. Jones, Big Push to Define Rights of Parents, SACRAmENTO BEE, Dec.
21, 1995, at AS.
6. See James E. Barnes, Parent Power, NAT'L J., June 12, 1993, at 1399 (describing
the growth of national training and the organization of groups such as Of the People fos-
tering the growth of parental rights advocates).
7. See James Brooke, Parental Rights Measure Not So Simple, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
1996, at A14; Mike Allen, Conservatives Lobby for Parental Rights, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 15,
1996, at A10.
8. H.R. 1946, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (introduced on June 28, 1995, by Rep.
Steven Largent); S. 984, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (introduced on June 29, 1995, by Sen.
Charles E. Grassley).
9. See infra Part IV.
10. Although the PRRA is a proposed statute, it explicitly aligns itself with early con-
stitutional analysis on the issue of parental rights and invites the courts to apply it as if it
were a rule based on the Constitution. See H.R. 1946, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1, 4 (1995);
see also Interview of Rep. Steven Largent, Burden of Proof (CNN television broadcast,
Nov. 1, 1995) ("[W]hat we are doing is basically codifying into federal statute those
Supreme Court cases that say that parental rights are a fundamental right.").
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ing.11 It could also boost parental power over public school curricula
and strengthen the parents' position in neglect and abuse cases. 12
This Note will argue that current reform efforts to strengthen pa-
rental rights go too far towards isolating parental authority from the
oversight of the community, to the detriment of children's interests
and rights. This extended right of parental control results in a danger-
ous and unnecessary cession of state power that necessarily tramples
on the fundamental rights of children.
On the other hand, there is an unquestioned value for children in
a close, loving relationship with their parents and in the guidance and
direction they offer. A parent's authority cannot be undermined by
the state without seriously damaging the parent-child relationship and
inhibiting children's development. Crucially, this relationship carries
important benefits and meaning to parents as well, not just to their
children. As individuals forming intimate relationships, parents de-
serve at least as much protection for those relationships with their
children as is accorded to spouses and unmarried partners. Thus, this
Note will also disagree with scholars advocating "licensee" or stew-
ardship models inasmuch as they deny parents protection for this val-
uable and historically recognized relationship with their children.
Instead, this Note will offer a model of an associational parental
right derived from existing Supreme Court precedent and the work of
Professor Kenneth Karst. It will suggest that parental rights should be
recognized as already falling within the right to privacy that has been
previously identified as emanating from the Bill of Rights. However,
because the right should be one of association rather than of control
(in the sense of an owner's control over her property), it would only
extend to situations that might endanger the quality of the parent-
child relationship.
In Part I, this Note will offer an interpretation of the confused
constitutional history of parental rights at the Supreme Court level.
Part II will canvass the varied and contradictory lower court interpre-
tations of those cases. Part III will survey reform efforts on the na-
tional and state levels and make comparisons to another recent
codification of Supreme Court constitutional precedent, the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act. Using the example of sex education in
public schools, this Part will demonstrate how the extension of paren-
tal rights proposed by reformers will burden the rights of children.
Part IV will contrast these approaches with suggestions by some schol-
11. See Brooke, supra note 7, at A14; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, A Public Role in
the Private Family: The Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act and the Politics of Child
Protection and Education, 57 Omo ST. L. J. 393, 399 (1996) [hereinafter A Public Role in
the Private Family].
12. See Woodhouse, A Public Role in the Private Family, supra note 11, at 406.
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ars that the state should take a much more active role in the rearing of
children than it presently does in order to safeguard children's rights
and interests. Part V will argue that parental rights should be pro-
tected under the auspices of the constitutional right to privacy. It will
contend that this is more consistent with the Court's treatment of
other personal due process rights, such as the right to use contracep-
tion and the right to have an abortion, than is a right predicated on a
property-style relationship between parents and children. Also, it will
argue that this offers an adequate balance between the need for family
and personal autonomy from the state and the need to protect chil-
dren's interests and rights.
I. The Constitutional History of Parental Rights-An
Interpretation of Supreme Court Precedent
A. The Lochner Era
Although parents received a great deal of protection from state
intervention at common law,13 the Supreme Court first recognized a
constitutional right of child-rearing in 1923 in the case of Meyer v. Ne-
braska.14 The defendant in that case was a grade-school German
teacher who had been prosecuted under a Nebraska statute making it
unlawful to teach any languages other than English to children before
the eighth grade.15
The Supreme Court of Nebraska had upheld the statute, finding
that the state had a legitimate interest in countering "the baneful ef-
fects of permitting foreigners who had taken residence in this country,
to rear and educate their children in the language of their native
land.' 6 According to the Nebraska high court, teaching modem for-
eign languages to young children would "naturally inculcate in them
the ideas and sentiments foreign to the best interests of this coun-
try."'17 The court dismissed the due process claim, noting that choices
13. These protections included parental immunity from suit by their children over
torts such as personal injury, negligence, and even rape. This common law immunity has
been chipped away significantly in the last century. Also, many state agencies with respon-
sibility to curb parents' excesses were denied significant enforcement power in an effort to
curb governmental intrusion. See Andrew Jay Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among
Infants, Their Parents and the State, 4 FAM. L. Q. 410, 425-33 (1970).
14. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). For an extraordinarily thorough historical examination of the
politics, personalities and social forces behind Meyer and other cases of the period, see
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as
Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995 (1992) [hereinafter Who Owns the Child?].
15. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396-97.
16. Id. at 397-98.
17. Id. at 398.
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in subject matter taught in schools must inevitably be made because of
limited time and resources.' s
In an opinion by Justice McReynolds, the Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that the state action violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Justice McReynolds described a broad reading of "liberty" in
the Amendment:1 9
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the lib-
erty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration,
and some of the included things have been definitely stated. With-
out doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but
also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according
to the dictates of his own conscience, and, generally, to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.20
Because liberty was impinged by this state intrusion into chil-
dren's schooling, the state could not enforce a law that was "arbitrary
or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the compe-
tency of the State to effect. '21 In finding the state's ends invalid, the
Court compared the statute to Plato's theory that the state should en-
tirely usurp the parent's role, providing common guardianship, such
that "no parent is to know his own child .... ". 22 The Court also
compared it to the practice of the Spartans who tried to discourage
individualism in order to develop "ideal citizens" by housing boys to-
gether in barracks and entrusting their care to trainers 23 These social
models, the Court stressed, had been rejected by American society
and the Constitution.2 4
Two years later, Justice McReynolds wrote again for the Court in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters.25 In that case, the Court struck down an
Oregon statute requiring nearly all children between the ages of eight
and sixteen to attend public schools,2 6 in effect outlawing private and
18. See Id.
19. "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
20. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (citations omitted). The Court cited a string of cases in
support of this proposition, most of which treated the rights of employees and freedom of
contract. None of the cases cited treated the issue of child-rearing or parental rights.
21. Id. at 400.
22. Id. at 401.
23. Id. at 402.
24. Id. at 401-02. See also Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 409 (1923) (citing Meyer to
invalidate similar statutes in Iowa and Ohio).
25. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
26. The law provided exemptions for children too physically disabled to attend school
or who lived at a great distance from a school and for those who had completed the eighth
grade. 1922 Or. Laws § 52529. The statute also created a limited mechanism whereby
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home schooling at that level.27 In invalidating the statute, the Court
cited the "doctrine of Meyer:" that there is a "liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control. '2 8 Justice McReynolds again invoked the specter of the
all-enveloping government, insisting that the "child is not the mere
creature of the state."29
Both Meyer and Pierce are coy about calling the parental right a
"fundamental right." This has led at least one commentator to accuse
the Court of "flirt[ing] with the notion that such authority could be
characterized as 'fundamental,"' 30 and others to say that the rights
were not meant to be fundamental.31 In his general analysis in Meyer,
however, Justice McReynolds does note that "the individual has cer-
tain fundamental rights which must be respected. ' 32 This is a good
indication that he meant parental rights to be understood as
fundamental.
It is important to note, however, that the division of due process
into "just plain" liberty rights, requiring a legitimate state interest to
overcome, and "fundamental rights," requiring a compelling state in-
terest, was not as crucial in due process jurisprudence at the beginning
of the century as it is today.33 For instance, Lochner v. New York,34
the infamous case that struck down a state maximum work hours law,
never described the "right to contract" as "fundamental." Under
Lochner and its associated cases, heightened scrutiny was not neces-
sary for the courts to review and strike down legislative acts.3 5 Only
in relatively modem cases has the court begun finding "fundamental"
rights as part of the process of reasserting the Court's competence to
review legislative acts.36 The Court in Meyer and Pierce clearly en-
children could receive private education under special permit by the county superintendent
with an elaborate testing and reviewing mechanism required of selected children. Id. The
Pierce Court did not discuss the issue of whether this permit system allowing at least some
parents and children to opt out should make any difference in the due process analysis. In
1927, however, the Court made clear that states could not avoid due process constraints by
technically allowing private schools to exist, but regulating them so severely in fact as to
make their existence impossible. See Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298 (1927).
27. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534.
28. Id. at 534-35.
29. Id. at 535.
30. Raymond C. O'Brien, An Analysis of Realistic Due Process Rights of Children
Versus Parents, CONN. L. REv. 1209, 1216 (1994).
31. See infra Part IV.
32. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401.
33. See JoHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUONAL LAW 383-84 (4th
ed. 1991).
34. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
35. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 33, at 383.
36. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 33, at 383-84; LAWRENCE H. TRIE, ANMRI-
CAN CONsTrrTiONAL LAW 769-74 (2d ed. 1988). This can be seen in the "incorporation"
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gaged in what would today be considered heightened scrutiny of gov-
ernment objectives despite using "rational basis" language.
This association of Meyer and Pierce with the Lochner Era argua-
bly presents a problem of their viability as precedent today. During
the Lochner Era, the Court expanded the reach of Fourteenth
Amendment due process to strike down laws designed to create mini-
mum wages and regulate conditions for workers. 37 This expansive ju-
dicial review of state legislative acts was repudiated in many
subsequent cases from the 1940s through the 1960s.38 However,
Meyer and Pierce seem to have escaped the general disapproval of due
process cases of this era both in constitutional scholarship 39 and in
dicta of many subsequent Supreme Court decisions.40 This might be
attributable to the fact that unlike the other famous Lochner Era due
process cases, Meyer and Pierce concerned individual rights outside
the workplace. Laissez-faire economic philosophy had little to do
with these decisions and so the repudiation of the Court's intervention
in state economic policies did not implicate them directly.41
Another suggested weakness of Meyer and Pierce as precedent
for a fundamental liberty of parenting is that the issues involved really
cases in which the Court found that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed the protection
of selected rights from the Bill of Rights from state action. Id. (citing, for example,
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968) (holding that the Sixth Amendment
right of trial by jury is incorporated in Fourteenth Amendment Due Process)); TRIBE,
supra, at 769-74 (same).
37. The "Lochner Era" has been described as stretching from the Court's decision in
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), through West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937). See TRIBE, supra note 36, at 567. Like the case for which it is named, Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), many Lochner Era cases involve broad interpretations of
employees' due process "contract rights" as against state efforts to shore up minimum
wages and working conditions. Id. at 567-68.
38. See, e.g., Lincoln Fed. Lab. Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S.
525,536 (1949) ("This Court beginning at least as early as 1934... has steadily rejected the
due process philosophy enunciated in the Adair-Coppage [Lochner Era] line of cases.");
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) ("The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner,
Coppage, Adkins, Burns, and like cases-that due process authorizes courts to hold laws
unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely-has long since been
discarded."); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) ("The day is gone
when this Court uses the Due Process Clause to strike down state laws, regulatory of busi-
ness and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of har-
mony with a particular school of thought.").
39. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 36, at 1318; Norman B. Smith, Constitutional Rights of
Students, Their Families and Teachers in the Public Schools, 10 CAMPBELL L. REV. 353, 380
(1988).
40. See, eg., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,231-33 (1972); Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
41. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 n.8 (1977) (making this
argument for Meyer's and Pierce's longevity).
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arose under the First Amendment.42 In Meyer, the issue was the com-
munication of the German language. In Pierce, it was religious and
other non-public types of education. Apparently this was also the
analysis of Justice Douglas, who described the decisions in First
Amendment terms in dicta in Griswold v. Connecticut.43 While the
Court might very well have chosen to resolve the issues involved in
Meyer and Pierce via the First Amendment, however, both decisions
make explicit reference to due process (well before any incorporation
of the Bill of Rights had taken place) and do not make reference to
the First Amendment.44 Thus, this argument has little textual support
in the cases themselves.
B. Limits to Parental Rights and the Intertwining of Freedom of Religion
and Due Process Rights
Since Meyer and Pierce, the Court has been somewhat erratic in
its approach to a fundamental right of child-rearing. While continuing
to acknowledge the traditional authority of parents and espousing hes-
itation in state involvement in family affairs, the Court has imposed
both explicit and implicit limitations on child-rearing rights.
In the 1944 case of Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court described
the relationship of state and parent in broad terms: "It is cardinal
with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in
the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."45 However,
Prince also provided some important limitations on the scope of the
rights, and has therefore also been cited by opponents of strong pa-
rental authority.46 In Prince, Justice Rutledge's majority opinion up-
held the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness under a statute that
forbade adults to permit minor children to work. 47 The defendant in
that case had allowed her young niece to sell copies of religious tracts
42. See Francis Barry McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning of
Parental Rights, 22 GA. L. REv. 975, 989 (1988). Professor McCarthy further notes that
parents were not a party in either Meyer or Pierce, but that the Court nevertheless ad-
dressed their rights as an important part of its analysis. Id. at 986 n.53.
43. 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). See Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d
525, 533 n.5 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1044 (1996); NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note
33, at 393-94.
44. Though it may be wishful thinking on the part of modem commentators to make
Meyer and Pierce into First Amendment cases, in later cases, such as Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court did
explicitly link First Amendment protections of religion with the due process parental right.
See infra Part I.C.
45. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
46. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 630 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 170.
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alongside her on the street and to participate in preaching.48 The de-
fendant brought a First Amendment freedom of religion claim "but-
tressed" with a due process parental fights claim. 49 The Court
insisted, despite its "cardinal rule" quoted above, that the state has "a
wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in
things affecting the child's welfare; and that this includes, to some ex-
tent, matters of conscience and religious conviction." 50 Both the child
and the community as a whole have an interest "that children be both
safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth into free
and independent well-developed men and citizens. '51 Operating on
this interest, the state may compel school attendance, regulate child
labor, and demand that children be vaccinated (whether or not this
violates parents' personal and religious views of medical treatment). 52
Unlike Meyer and Pierce, the Prince majority also analyzed the
issue from the standpoint of the child-in that case, the child's right to
work.5 3 The Court held that the state may constrain children's rights
more than those of adults in an effort to secure their development into
productive adult citizens.54 The Court noted that selling religious
tracts on the street could expose children to dangerous and difficult
situations, and famously stated: "Parents may be free to become mar-
tyrs themselves. But it does not follow that they are free, in identical
circumstances, to make martyrs of their children." 55
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Court began the process of rehabili-
tating the Due Process Clause and creating the modem right of pri-
vacy. A number of the seminal cases make mention of the parental
rights protections of Pierce, Meyer, and Prince, without specifically re-
lying on them for their results. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court
held that married couples had a right to receive and use contracep-
tives, by finding that the enumerated rights of the Bill of Rights have
"penumbras" which extend to unmentioned protections necessary to
protect the explicitly guaranteed rights.56 The Court discussed Meyer
48. Id. at 162. The defendant was her niece's guardian. Id. at 161.
49. Id at 164.
50. Id at 167.
51. Id at 165.
52. Id. at 166.
53. But see James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the
Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 CALIF. L. REv. 1371, 1382 (1994) (arguing that the Prince
Court was only really interested in the harms to society caused by child labor and did not
seek to protect children against harms parents subject them to because of their religious
beliefs).
54. Prince, 321 U.S. at 168.
55. Id. at 170.
56. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)
(extending the right of contraception to non-married couples under an equal protection
analysis, and reaffirming "the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
January 19971 PARENTAL RIGHTS
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and Pierce as cases guaranteeing rights peripheral to First Amend-
ment free speech rights.57 The Court also noted the creation, in
NAACP v. Alabama,58 of the "freedom to associate and privacy in
one's associations," which it found also to be in assistance of the First
Amendment.5 9 In addition to the First Amendment, penumbras from
the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments contributed to the
right to privacy.60 Similarly in Roe v. Wade, the Court mentioned
Pierce and Meyer as among the building blocks of the right to choose
whether or not to bear children.61
Although the Court seemed to be incorporating the earlier guar-
antees of parental rights in its new right to privacy, subsequent cases
on due process parental rights have sounded a hesitant note. In Wis-
consin v. Yoder, adherents of the Old Order Amish sect were prohib-
ited by the state from withdrawing their children from public school
after the eighth grade in violation of truancy laws.62 In holding for the
Amish parents, the Court seemed to rely primarily on their religious
beliefs.63 The Court balanced the admittedly strong state interest in
providing public schooling to children (calling it "the very apex of the
function of a State") against the centuries-old traditions of the Old
Order Amish of avoiding contact with and knowledge of the world
outside their communities in order to focus on their religious way of
life.64 The Amish parents' interest was in keeping their children both
mentally and physically inside their community, and involving them in
the physical labor that their parents' religious beliefs valued highly.65
Justice Burger's majority opinion exhaustively details the depth and
age of the Old Order Amish religious beliefs to show that the criminal
liability the state wished to impose on them stemmed from religious
practice.66
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.") (emphasis in original).
57. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482.
58. 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (invalidating state attempts to halt the organizing activi-
ties of a civil rights activist and compel production of membership lists and other informa-
tion about the NAACP).
59. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483.
60. Id. at 484. In a line of cases running parallel to the development of the modern
right to privacy, the Court held that nearly all of the protections of the Bill of Rights were
applicable to state action through "incorporation" in the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. See generally TRIBE, supra note 36, at 772-74.
61. 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
62. 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
63. Id. at 216.
64. Id. at 213-29.
65. Id. at 210-12.
66. Id.
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After having laid the basis for affirming the First Amendment
freedom of religion claim, Justice Burger asserts that "this case in-
volves the fundamental interests of parents, as contrasted with that of
the State, to guide the religious future and education of their chil-
dren."' 67 The opinion does not use the word "right" to describe what
is at stake for parents, but instead uses "interests." That this is of
more than semantic concern is shown by the subsequent paragraphs.
Justice Burger cites Pierce v. Society of Sisters68 but narrows its hold-
ing to issues of religious concern to parents:
However read, the Court's holding in Pierce stands as a charter of
the rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their chil-
dren. And, when the interests of parenthood are combined with a
free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, more than
merely "a reasonable relation to some purpose within the compe-
tency of the State" is required to sustain the validity of the State's
requirement under the First Amendment.69
By implication, Justice Burger said that, while a combined free-
dom of religion and parental "interests" claim invokes heightened
scrutiny, an unadorned claim of parental rights under due process
does not.70 In an earlier portion of the opinion, Justice Burger is care-
ful to note that it is only because of the religious attachment of the
Old Order Amish to their lifestyle that the lifestyle was significant to
67. Id. at 232 (emphasis added). Justice Burger was careful to avoid the issue of what
happens when children expressly disagree with what their parents want them to do, finding
that this was not raised in the facts of Yoder. Id. at 231. But see id. at 243-46 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (finding that the issue must be addressed and arguing that the child's own views
should be respected). This question seems to have been decided in favor of the parents in
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979), in which the Court upheld parents' right to com-
mit their children to mental institutions against their will.
68. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
69. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233 (emphasis added).
70. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,881 (1990) (noting that First Amend-
ment freedom of religion rights and parental rights combined powerfully in Yoder and
other cases to bar application of a neutral, generally applicable law). One commentator
argues that another implicit limitation to the parental rights doctrine recognized in Meyer
and Pierce took place in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(Brown 1), and 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown 11). See Kleinfeld, supra note 13, at 419-23.
Kleinfeld points out that in several cases including Griffin v. Prince Edward County School
Board, 377 U.S. 218,232 (1964), and Green v. Country School Board, 391 U.S. 430,441-42
(1968), the Court invalidated state attempts to give parents control over where they sent
their children to school because they were efforts to evade desegregation. ld. at 423.
Kleinfeld argues that this limits the Meyer-Pierce doctrine in cases in which an important
public policy conflicts with parents' desires. It This limitation is even stronger than the
one articulated in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), because the Court in Green
and Griffin held that the states must prohibit parents from exercising their discretion,
whereas in Prince the Court simply allowed that states may circumscribe parental rights.
Id. at 422 n.34. Another interpretation, of course, is that the state had a compelling inter-
est in achieving desegregation that overrode the fundamental parental right.
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the Court. 71 A "simple" lifestyle based on non-religious morality or
philosophy, like that advocated by William Thoreau, would merit no
protection.72 Thus, simply as moral parents, the Old Order Amish
would have no claim.73
Also telling are the concurring and dissenting opinions. In the
concurring opinion by Justice Stewart (joined by Justice Brennan), no
mention of parental rights is made.74 In his concurring opinion, Jus-
tice White (joined by Justices Brennan and Stewart) insists that
"Pierce v. Society of Sisters[ ] lends no support to the contention that
parents may replace state educational requirements with their own id-
iosyncratic views of what knowledge a child needs to be a productive
and happy member of society .... "-5 In his dissent, Justice Douglas
dismissively notes that "[o]ur opinions are full of talk about the power
of the parents over the child's education, ' 76 but insists that children
have rights that are not necessarily identical to their parents', and that
these rights must be protected. 77 For Justice Douglas, it was very im-
portant that children be heard: "It is the student's judgment, not his
parents', that is essential if we are to give full meaning to what we
have said about the Bill of Rights and of the right of students to be
masters of their own destiny."78
These implicit doubts about the scope of Pierce and Meyer were
reinforced by the Court in Norwood v. Harrison79 and Runyon v. Mc-
Crary.80 In Norwood, the Court rejected claims by parents of children
in racially-discriminatory private schools that Pierce required the state
to provide textbooks to those schools in order to effectuate the par-
ents' right to control their children's upbringing.8' Justice Stewart's
majority opinion insisted that Pierce only ensured the right of private
schools to exist, not that the state had to participate to give parents'
choices equal support.s2 In Runyon, the Court upheld a claim by
black parents that their statutory right to make and enforce contracts
71. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16.
72. Id.
73. Id. Given that in this part of the opinion Justice Burger is focused on the First
Amendment analysis, an argument could be made that these statements do not pertain to
due process rights, and only stand for the unsurprising insight that religious belief is neces-
sary to make out a freedom of religion claim. Nevertheless, it is notable that the opinion
makes no effort to reserve the due process parental rights question at this point.
74. See icL at 237 (Stewart, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 239 (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 243 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
77. Id. at 243-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
78. Id. at 245 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
79. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
80. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
81. See Norwood, 413 U.S. at 461-62.
82. See id. at 462.
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equally was violated by the defendant private school's refusal to admit
their children.83 The defendants raised parental rights as one of their
defenses.84 In dismissing this defense, Justice White noted that Yoder
and Norwood had read parental rights narrowly, to exclude parents'
idiosyncratic views on education.85
C. A Turn Toward a Stronger Parental Rights Standard?
Several years after Yoder, the Court seemed to turn toward a
more expansive view of parental rights in several cases in the realm of
health care and termination of custody rights. In Parham v. JR., the
Court upheld a Georgia statute that allowed parents to commit their
children to mental institutions against their will and without a hear-
ing.86 Justice Burger's majority opinion placed a great deal of faith in
parents to make crucial decisions about the best interests of their chil-
dren: "Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civiliza-
tion concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority
over minor children." 87 This authority would be expressed in the as-
sumption that parents act in the best interests of the child.88 So, even
though a child "may balk at hospitalization," that should not diminish
the parents' authority, because parents can use their mature reasoning
to act in the best interests of the child.89 The state should involve
itself as little as possible in this personal family realm.90 The Court
indicated that there is a limit to parents' authority, but was vague
about where that limit lies. 91 In the "voluntary" commitment setting,
parents should have "a substantial, if not the dominant, role in the
decision." 92
Nevertheless, the Court recognized that the child has "a pro-
tectible interest" in avoiding bodily restraint, and that the state also
has interests, identified as saving money by discouraging unnecessary
institutionalization and reducing procedural barriers to commitment
of mentally ill patients.93 It balanced these interests against those of
83. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 172.
84. Id. at 176.
85. Id. at 177.
86. 442 U.S. 584, 616 (1979). Under the statute, however, a parent's decision to com-
mit a child must be supported by the mental hospital's superintendent after examining the
child. Id. at 591.
87. Id. at 602.
88. See i& This would be so despite the high incidence of child abuse because the
majority of parents shouldn't suffer a loss of their authority due to the abuses of a minority.
Id. at 603.
89. Parham, 442 U.S. at 603-04.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 604-05.
92. Id. at 604.
93. Id. at 601, 604-05.
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the parents and found that to protect the child's and the state's inter-
ests, a neutral, detached fact finder must make the final decision as to
the commitment.94 However, this could be an "informal" decision
based on medical investigation by a physician.95 The Court distin-
guished the facts of Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, in which the
Court invalidated a statute giving parents an absolute veto over their
minor children's decision to have an abortion.96 In Parham, the par-
ents were required to gain the assent of a physician before committing
their child, and thus did not have plenary power.97
Even in cases involving parental abuse and neglect, the Court has
upheld the presumption that parents act in their children's best inter-
est. In Santosky v. Kramer, this presumption was expressed by requir-
ing a heightened standard of evidence to terminate parental rights.98
The Court held that the "clear and convincing" evidence standard
(rather than the preponderance of the evidence standard) must be
used in hearings regarding the termination of parental rights due to
abuse or neglect.99 The majority explained that "[tihe fundamental
liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and manage-
ment of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not
been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to
the State."'100
The state's power to act on the child's behalf was found to be
similarly limited in other Supreme Court dicta of the same period. In
a concurrence in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, Justice
Stewart asserted that the state could not break up a family over both
the parents' and children's protest just to further the "children's best
interest."'101 Similarly, the majority in Stanley v. Illinois found that the
state's interests in the care and custody of a child would be "de
minimis" if the child were in the custody of a "fit" parent.10 2
94. See id. at 606.
95. Id. at 607-08.
96. 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
97. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 604.
98. 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982).
99. Id. at 769.
100. Id. at 753. For an argument that the Santosky standard ignores the realities of
abused and neglected children, see Raymond C. O'Brien, An Analysis of Realistic Due
Process Rights of Children Versus Parents, 26 CoNN. L. Rnv. 1209, 1246 (1994).
101. 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring).
102. 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972). See also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,255 (1978)
("We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and
child is constitutionally protected."); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-
40 (1974) ("[F]reedom of personal choice in matters of ... family life is one of the liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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Most recently, the Court again reaffirmed the prominence of pa-
rental rights in M.L.B. v. S.LJ. 103 In that case, the Court upheld the
right of an indigent parent to have court fees waived in proceedings to
terminate her rights to her child.10 4 The Court's decision was based
on equal protection doctrine borrowed from Griffin v. Illinois, other
cases guaranteeing indigent criminal defendants access to the courts,
and due process.10 5
In making its due process argument, the Court stated, "choices
about marriage, family life and the upbringing of children are among
associational rights this Court has ranked as 'of basic importance in
society,' ... rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against
the State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard or disrespect.' u0 6 In
support of this statement, the Court cited, among other authority,
Meyer and Pierce.0 7
H. Parental Rights in the Lower Courts
With the modem Supreme Court's view of the meaning of Meyer
and Pierce so unsettled, it can hardly be surprising that the lower
courts have also produced an array of interpretations. Although there
are numerous examples of lower courts making strong statements in
favor of parental rights, 08 many recent decisions have refused to rec-
ognize a fundamental parental right, especially in cases having to do
with public education.
In Medeiros v. Kiyosaki, the Hawaii Supreme Court rejected a
claim by parents that a sex education television series shown to their
children in a public school violated their constitutional right to direct
their children's upbringing. 0 9 The court rejected claims based on
freedom of religion and privacy rights of parents. 110 The court read
Griswold v. Connecticut"' to forbid the use of "unnecessarily broad
means" by the government in achieving its goals when they conflict
103. 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996).
104. Id. at 569.
105. See id. at 560-64.
106. Id. at 564 (citation omitted).
107. ld.
108. See, eg., State v. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750, 768 (Ohio 1970) ("[I]t has long been
recognized that the right of a parent to guide the education, including the religious educa-
tion, of his or her children is indeed a 'fundamental right' guaranteed by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1373, 1377 (Utah 1982)
(finding that parental rights are fundamental under both the U.S. and Utah constitutions
and that "[t]he integrity of the family and the parents' inherent right and authority to rear
their own children have been recognized as fundamental axioms of Anglo-American cul-
ture, presupposed by all our social, political, and legal institutions").
109. 478 P.2d 314, 319 (Haw. 1970).
110. See id. at 317, 319.
111. 381 U.S. 479 (1968).
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with the right to privacy.112 In this case, because the state had allowed
parents to submit excuses for their children in advance if they ob-
jected to the education programs, the program was not compulsory
and therefore not "unnecessarily broad." 1 3 The court dismissed the
plaintiffs' reliance on Meyer and Pierce, holding that they applied to
speech and press freedoms, rather than the penumbral privacy rights
of parents, and that restricting speech by stopping the use of the edu-
cational programs would be inimical to First Amendment
protection." 4
In State v. Bennett, the Michigan Supreme Court was equally dis-
missive of the notion of a fundamental parental right in holding that a
state teacher certification requirement did not infringe on any funda-
mental parental right by making it more difficult for parents to engage
in home schooling.1 5 The court interpreted both Meyer or Pierce to
concern issues within the First Amendment." 6 Therefore, the state
court argued, all of Meyer's and Pierce's statements about parental
rights were dicta.1'7 Similarly, the court found that Wisconsin v.
Yoder" 8 primarily concerned parents' freedom of religion and did not
establish or support a due process parental right." 9 The court con-
cluded that the right of parents to direct their children's educations is
not fundamental, and thus not deserving of strict scrutiny.120
The federal circuit courts have also given varying support for pa-
rental rights. The Third Circuit found in Halderman v. Pennhurst State
School and Hospital'2l that the Supreme Court's decision in Parham
v. J.R.122 had established a balancing test between parents', state's,
and children's interests, which it applied in that case to the court-or-
dered state transfer of a retarded child from a state school and hospi-
tal to a community living situation after review by a hearing master.'23
After examining Meyer, Pierce, Yoder, and Parham, the court found
112. Medeiros, 478 P.2d at 316.
113. Id. at 317. The freedom of religion claim failed for the same reason. Id.
114. See id. See also Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Bd. of Educ.,
124 Cal. Rptr. 68, 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (upholding family life and sex education pro-
grams against parental rights and other claims), appeal dismissed, 425 U.S. 908 (1976).
115. 501 N.W.2d 106, 111-12 (Mich. 1993). Cf. People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127, 144
(Mich. 1993) (holding that portions of the teacher certification requirement reviewed in
Bennett did unconstitutionally infringe religious parents' First Amendment freedom of
religion rights by making it overly difficult to engage in home schooling).
116. See Bennett, 501 N.W.2d at 328.
117. See id. at 113.
118. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
119. See Bennett, 501 N.W.2d at 113-14.
120. Id. at 115.
121. 707 F.2d 702, 708 (3d Cir. 1983).
122. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
123. See Halderman, 707 F.2d at 703-04.
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that there is a protectible parental right, but that this is a "substantial"
right, not a "fundamental" one.124 The court analogized the peculiar
situation of parents' "substantial, if not not dominant" status to the
intermediate level of scrutiny used for gender, alienage, illegitimacy,
and some other classes under the equal protection clause.125 The Fifth
Circuit also found that parental rights are not absolute and must be
balanced with state interests. 126 By contrast, the Second, Fourth, and
Eighth Circuits have found that parental rights, while protected, only
merit "rational basis" review.127
In Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Productions, Inc., the most re-
cent circuit decision on the subject, the First Circuit concluded that
the Supreme Court has yet to determine if parental rights are funda-
mental, and declined to decide that issue.128 In that case., the First
Circuit struck down claims by parents that a public school safe sex
presentation given to their children without prior notice violated their
freedom of religion and their due process parental rights. 2 9 The court
held that even if parental rights were fundamental, the state had a
compelling interest in providing safe sex information to children at
risk. The court refused to read Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Soci-
ety of Sisters as creating a fundamental parental right because they
were "decided well before the current 'right to privacy"' cases. 30
Even if they did create such a right, the court held, the parents' claim
would fail because "plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate an intrusion
of constitutional magnitude on this right.'' The court explained that
Meyer and Pierce protected parents' ability to choose different paths
of education for their children, but not to dictate the curricula of pub-
124. Id. at 709. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
125. See Haldernan, 707 F.2d at 709 n.7.
126. See Brantley v. Surles, 718 F.2d 1354, 1359 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding that parental
rights must be balanced against the state's interests in education in a case where a public
school employee was fired after sending her child to a private school).
127. See Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 463 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding
a school community service requirement against claims that it violated, inter alia, due pro-
cess parental rights to direct the upbringing of their children); Murphy v. Arkansas, 852
F.2d 1039, 1044 (8th Cir. 1988)(upholding a state law requiring home school students to
undergo standardized testing against claims that it violated parental rights to educate their
children at home for religious reasons); Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 428 F.2d 471, 472
(4th Cir. 1970) (incorporating the reasoning of the lower court which applied rational basis
review to parental rights claims), cerL denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970).
128. 68 F.3d 525, 532-35 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1044 (1996). See also
Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1167-69 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829 (1980)
(declining to find whether a compelling state interest is necessary to infringe on parental
rights because they were not implicated in the case of a health center distributing contra-
ception to children without parents' consent).
129. Brown, 68 F.3d 525, 534, 539 (1st Cir. 1995), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 1044 (1996).




lic schools once they had chosen to send their children there.132 Be-
cause their parental rights had not been violated, the court also
rejected the parents' hybrid claim (including both First Amendment
free exercise of religion rights and due process parental rights) under
Wisconsin v. Yoder.133
i1. Movement for Reform
A. The Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act
In response to their difficulty in the courts, conservative organiza-
tions such as the Christian Coalition and Of the People have pressed
for a reaffirmation of child-rearing rights in the political arena.' 34 On
the federal level, they have championed the Parental Rights and Re-
sponsibilities Act (PRRA). 35 The PRRA, sponsored by Representa-
tive Steven Largent in the House of Representatives and (in an
identical version) by Senator Charles E. Grassley in the Senate, de-
clares the fundamental "right of parents to direct the upbringing of a
child" and requires that a compelling state interest be shown before
the parents' role is "usurped.' 36 The "right of a parent to direct the
upbringing of a child" includes but is not limited to: directing a child's
education; making health care decisions (except where such a decision
may result in death or serious physical injury); disciplining a child-
including corporal punishment (limited by a separate section exclud-
ing "abuse and neglect as the terms have been traditionally defined");
'37 and directing the religious teaching of a child.' 38 The bill also cre-
ates a four-part process for analyzing cases involving parental rights:
the parent must demonstrate (1) that his or her claim arises from the
parental right and (2) that the government has usurped that right.
The burden then shifts to the government to show (3) that the "usur-
pation" furthers a compelling governmental interest and (4) that it is
132. See id
133. See id. at 539. Such a hybrid would be necessary for a First Amendment claim to
overcome a generally applicable law not specifically designed to burden religion. Id See
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990).
134. See Allen, supra note 7, at A10.
135. H.R. 1946, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 984, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
136. "Prohibition on Interfering with or Usurping Rights of Parents. No Federal,
State, or local government, or any official of such a government acting under color of law,
shall interfere with or usurp the right of a parent to direct the upbringing of the child of the
parent." H.R. 1946, § 4. "Strict Scrutiny. No exception to section 4 shall be permitted,
unless the government or official is able to demonstrate, by appropriate evidence, that the
interference or usurpation is essential to accomplish a compelling governmental interest
and is narrowly drawn or applied in a manner that is the least restrictive means of accom-
plishing the compelling interest." IL § 5.
137. Id. § 3(4)(A)(iii) and (C).
138. Id. § 3(4)(A)(iv).
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achieved by the least restrictive means of accomplishing the compel-
ling interest.139
The authors of the bill consider it to be a reaffirmation of the
original rules of Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.
The "Findings and Purposes" section of the PRRA cites these deci-
sions,140 seemingly linking it to this due process adjudication. In com-
ments to the press and in congressional hearings, the sponsors have
confirmed this intent.14'
A companion bill with a narrower scope, the Family Privacy Pro-
tection Act, has already passed in the House of Representatives and is
currently under consideration in the Senate.142 The bill would require
researchers seeking information from an unemancipated minor in a
number of areas (including psychological problems, sexual behavior
or attitudes, and parental political affiliation and beliefs) to obtain
prior written permission from a parent or guardian. 143 The political
genesis of this bill seems to have been hostility towards sexual prac-
tices and drug use surveys administered to youth and the belief that
these surveys encourage such behavior. 44
It is interesting to note the similarities between these bills and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).145 That bill was passed
to avoid the Supreme Court's ruling in Employment Division v.
Smith146 that the First Amendment free exercise of religion clause
does not, by itself, suffice to overcome a law that is generally applica-
ble and not designed to burden religion. Under the RFRA, any gov-
ernment burden on the free exercise of religion must be justified by a
compelling interest and be narrowly tailored to that interest. 47 Like
139. Id. § 2(b)(6).
140. Id. § 2(a)(1) and (b)(3).
141. "[W]hat we are doing is basically codifying into federal statute those Supreme
Court cases that say that parental rights are a fundamental right." Interview of Rep.
Steven Largent, Burden of Proof (CNN television broadcast, Nov. 1, 1995). "[T]he
Supreme Court clearly regards the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their chil-
dren as a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. [Cites
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925)]. While the Supreme Court's intent to protect parental rights is unquestionable,
lower courts have not always followed this high standard to protect the parent child rela-
tionship. The recent lower court assault on the rights of parents to direct their children's
education, health care decisions, and discipline is unprecedented." Parental Rights and
Responsibilities Act of 1995; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Sen. Charles E.
Grassley).
142. H.R. 1271, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
143. Id. § 2.
144. Marilyn Elias, Consent Bill Upsets Researchers, USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 1996, at 1D.
145. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1995).
146. 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1995).
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the PRRA, the RFRA explicitly links itself to a former Supreme
Court ruling on the application of an individual right from the Bill of
Rights, in this case the First Amendment. 148 The RFRA carefully
states that it is not meant to (directly) preempt the First Amend-
ment.149 The Ninth Circuit recently upheld the constitutionality of the
RFRA in a case involving prosecutions of Rastafarians (among other
charges) for the simple possession of marijuana.150 Given this success,
national parental rights advocates can be encouraged that the PRRA's
approach of reviving the Meyer and Pierce protection of parental
rights will also be upheld.
B. State Efforts
A growing number of states are proposing language similar to the
PRRA as state constitutional amendments515 and state statutes. 5 2
148. Among the purposes of the RFRA was "to restore the compelling interest test as
set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1790 (1963) and
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972), and to guarantee
its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and ...
to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened
by government." 42 U.S.C. 2000bb(b)(1) (1995).
149. "Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to affect, interpret, or in any way
address that portion of the First Amendment prohibiting laws respecting the establishment
of religion (referred to in this section as the 'Establishment Clause'). Granting govern-
ment funding, benefits, or exemptions, to the extent permissible under the Establishment
Clause, shall not constitute a violation of this Chapter. As used in this section, the term
'granting,' used with respect to government funding, benefits, or exemptions, does not in-
clude the denial of government funding, benefits, or exemptions." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4
(1995).
150. United States v. Bauer, 75 F.3d 1366, 1375-76 (9th Cir.), affd on reh'g sub nom.
United States v. Treiber, 84 F.3d 1549, 1559 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. Martinez v.
United States, 117 S. Ct. 267 (1996).
151. The following information about the introduction of parental rights state constitu-
tional amendments was obtained from the LEXIS state legislation tracking databases. The
citations are in LEXIS search format. State constitutional amendments have been intro-
duced in the following states: Alabama (1996 AL H.B. 781 (introduced April 25, 1996, but
indefinitely postponed on May 8, 1996)); California (1995 CA A.C.A. 30 (introduced April
25, 1995), 1995 CA S.C.A. 5 (introduced February 2, 1995)); Georgia (1995 GA S.R. 167
(introduced February 6, 1995)); Illinois (1996 IL H.C.A. 31 (introduced February 9, 1996),
1995 IL H.J.R. 8 (introduced January 31, 1995), 1995 IL S.J.R. 7 (introduced January 25,
1995)); Hawaii (1995 HI H.B. 687 (introduced January 23, 1995)); Iowa (1995 IA H.J.R. 20
(introduced May 3, 1995), 1995 IA S.J.R. 8 (introduced February 6, 1995)); Kansas (1995
KS H.C.R. 5009 (introduced January 25, 1995 but failed to pass in a house vote on March
24, 1995)); Kentucky (1996 KY S.B. 385 (introduced March 5, 1996)); Michigan (1995 MI
S.J.R. 14 (introduced April 23, 1995)); Minnesota (1995 MN H.B. 605 (introduced Febru-
ary 13, 1995 but indefinitely postponed on March 12, 1996), 1995 MN S.B. 105 (January 18,
1995)); Nebraska (1995 NE L.R. 280 (introduced January 3, 1996)); Pennsylvania (1995 PA
H.B. 475 (introduced January 30, 1995)); New York (1995 NY A.B. 1620 (introduced Janu-
ary 24, 1995), 1995 NY S.B. 707 (introduced January 18, 1995)); South Carolina, (1995 SC
S.B. 120 (introduced January 10, 1995)); Utah (1996 UT HJ.R. 9 (introduced January 15,
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The most common version of the constitutional amendments reads:
"The right of parents to direct the upbringing and education of their
children shall not be infringed.' 53 None of these bills or amendments
have been enacted by the state legislatures at the time of the publica-
tion of this Note, and bills have been defeated in Kansas, Virginia, and
North Dakota. 54 Parental rights advocates suffered an important set-
back in the November 5, 1996, election when Colorado voters soundly
rejected Amendment 17, an initiative to add a parental rights amend-
ment to the Colorado constitution. 55 The Amendment 17 campaign
had been closely watched nationally as a test of public sentiment on
this issue. 156 Despite this setback, advocates remain determined to
press forward'5 7 and the movement is picking up powerful backers,
such as Virginia Governor George F. Allen and Michael P. Farris,
president of the Home School Legal Defense Association158 and for-
mer co-chair for Patrick Buchanan's presidential campaign. 5 9
1996)); Virginia (1996 VA H.J.R. 188 (introduced January 22, 1996), 1996 VA S.J.M. 98
(introduced January 22, 1996) (for a description of a recent Virginia state senate committee
vote on this measure, see lyler Whitley, Panel Advances Parental Rights, Hundreds Gather
to Show Support, RIcHMOND TIms-DISPATCH, Jan. 23, 1997, at Al)); Washington (1995
WA SJ.R. 8208 (January 20, 1995)). In 1995, similar amendments were defeated in North
Dakota and Kansas. See Allen, supra note 7. As noted infra, citizens in Colorado recently
rejected an initiative that would have amended the constitution of that state.
152. The following information about the introduction of parental rights state bills was
obtained from the LEXIS state legislation tracking databases. The citations are in LEXIS
search format. Bills to make parenting a fundamental right have been introduced in the
following states: Arizona (1997 AZ H.C.R. 2007 (introduced January, 1997)); Indiana
(1996 IN H.B. 1346 (introduced January 8, 1996)) (amended to remove language guaran-
teeing parent's fundamental rights and signed by the governor on March 21, 1996 (see Barb
Albert, Lawmakers Finish General Assembly Business, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 9, 1996,
at B5)); Kansas (1995 KS H.B. 3035 (introduced February 14, 1996)); Massachusetts (1995
MA H.B. 1285 (introduced January 27, 1995), 1995 MA H.B. 1817 (introduced February 1,
1995), 1995 MA S.B. 361 (introduced February 17, 1995)); Mississippi (1996 MS H.C.R. 3
(introduced January 3, 1996)); Nebraska (1995 NE L.R. 19 (introduced January 10, 1995));
North Dakota (1997 ND H.C.R. 3013 (introduced January 20,1997)); South Carolina (1997
SC H.B. 3168 (introduced January 14, 1997)); Texas (1997 TX H.J.R. 32 (introduced Janu-
ary 14, 1997)); Virginia (1995 VA H.C.R. 683 (introduced January 23, 1997)); Washington
(1995 WA H.B. 2442 (introduced January 10, 1996), 1995 WA H.B. 2937 (introduced Janu-
ary 30, 1996)); Wisconsin (1995 WI S.J.R. 19 (introduced March 22, 1995), 1995 WI A.J.R.
26 (introduced March 13, 1995)).
153. See Allen, supra note 7 at A10.
154. Id. See also Warren Fiske & Laura Lafay, Senate Kills "Parental Rights" Bill,
Democrats Lead Vote Against Amendment, VIRGINIA PILOT, Jan. 29, 1997, at Al.
155. See Robert Kowalski, Voters Reject Parental-Rights Measure, DENVER POsT, Nov.
6, 1996, at Al.
156. See id.
157. See id
158. See Fiske & Lafay, supra note 154, at Al.
159. Buchanan Aide Attended Fete for Extremists, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 27, 1996, at A2.
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C. Dangers of the Reformers' Version of Parental Rights-Sex Education
as an Example
As the reformers frame it, the question in the parental rights de-
bate is who will decide what is in the best interests of children: par-
ents or the government. However, the issue is not so simple. Under
the regime proposed by the reformers, there is essentially a zero-sum
relationship between the rights of children and those of their parents.
If the government is entirely shut out of the family, then the rights of
children will not be enforced unless it suits the whim of their parents.
Because children cannot be expected to demand enforcement of their
own rights, they must rely on some outside party to do so. Thus, their
rights will only be protected to the extent that the governmental inter-
est in them prevails over parental rights. By narrowing the govern-
ment's ability to intervene between parents and children to situations
where the government can show a compelling interest and narrowly
tailored solution, children's rights are inevitably squeezed out.
An example of how this might work can be seen in the issue of
sex education, as presented by the facts of the case in the First Cir-
cuit's last encounter with the parental rights issue: Brown v. Hot,
Sexy, and Safer Productions, described above in Part 111.60 Under the
approach favored by the parental rights advocates (and written into
their reform bills), the Court would recognize a fundamental right of
parents to control their children's upbringing, and analyze the situa-
tion to see if the state had infringed this right. The parental right in
Meyer and Pierce (as well as in the PRRA and other reform bills) is
defined broadly to encompass "direct[ing] the upbringing and educa-
tion of children.' 6' Parental rights advocates would argue that com-
pulsory sex education presented to children without prior parental
notification would infringe on this right. Certainly, in the basic sense,
such a presentation would impinge on a parent's decision to keep her
child away from sexual information. 62 Therefore, the burden should
160. 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1044 (1996). Apart from the
fact that it has been the locus of the parental rights battle in the courts, sex education is
also a useful example for a number of other reasons. It appears to be one of the major
areas that reformers have in mind in pursuing greater parental rights. See, e.g., Reverend
Louis Sheldon, Parents Must Have Right to Rear Kids, Cm. SuN-TImEs, Sept. 28, 1996, at
A14 (noting with alarm the facts of the case in Brown ). It also combines the areas of
education and public health, two of the main areas that parental rights will affect.
161. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
162. In Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Bd. of Educ., 124 Cal. Rptr.
68, 90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975), the California appellate court found that because the school
district allowed parents to opt their children out of sexual education programs, the parents'
right to privacy had not been violated. Advocates in Brown, on the other hand, were able
to argue that the school system contravened the parents' rights because the parents were
not allowed to opt their children out of the "assembly." See Brown, 68 F.3d at 534. The
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shift to the government to show that it has a compelling interest and
that its action was narrowly tailored to that interest.
It is not difficult to make the case for a compelling government
interest in reducing teen pregnancy and the spread of sexually-trans-
mitted diseases in children. There are over a million teenage
pregnancies in the United States every year.163 Teenagers also have
the highest incidence of sexually transmitted diseases and HIV infec-
tion.164 This phenomenon leads to enormous costs for government in
the form of financial and medical assistance, as well as the social costs
of youth raising children.165 Clearly, the government has a strong in-
terest in taking measures to stem this tide among teenagers.
However, it is not clear that this intervention could be described
as narrowly tailored to the governmental interest. In Brown, the
school responded with a program clearly designed to command the
attention of the students and teach them about safe sex. 166 Arguably,
the school could have achieved this goal without sexual information
and graphic language. Abstinence-focused sex education programs
such as Teen Aid and Sex Respect, which do not discuss contraception
or the mechanics of sex, pregnancy and sexual disease, have been
found to have some success on children's attitudes toward sex, which
can, in turn, have an effect on sexual activity.167 It is well accepted in
current research on sex education that simply teaching children the
"facts" about disease transmission and reproduction is less effective
than a program that also addresses factors of identity and self-es-
teem.168 However, there is no agreement in the scientific literature
regarding the relative effectiveness in reducing pregnancy and sexual
disease of abstinence-based sexual education programs and those dis-
cussing safe sex, when both address these self-esteem and identity is-
sues. Studies have indicated that abstinence-only programs are
effective in preventing disease.169 On the other hand, some studies
have found abstinence-only programs to be less effective than sex edu-
school appeared to have an opt out policy that had been neglected on this occasion. See id.
at 529-30.
163. Laura Kann et al., Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance-United States, 1995, 66 J. OF
SCHOOL HEALTH 365, 365 (1996).
164. DEP'T OF HEA.TH & HuMAN SERVS., HEALTHY PEOPLE 2000: NATIONAL
HEALTH PROMOTION AND DISEASE PREVENTION OBJECrIVES (1990).
165. See Howard B. Eisenberg, A 'Modest' Proposal: State Licensing of Parents, 26
CONN. L. Rnv. 1415, 1419 (1994).
166. 68 F.3d at 529.
167. Joseph A. Olsen et al., The Effects of Three Abstinence Sex Education Programs
on Student Attitudes Toward Sexual Activity, 26 ADOLESCENCE 631, 640-41 (1991).
168. See Larry W. Bates & Charles E. Joubert, Source of Sex Education in Relation to
Self-Esteem and Attitudes Towards AIDS Precautions Among College Students, 72
PSYCHOL. REP. 603, 603 (1993).
169. See Olsen, supra note 167, at 633.
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cation that includes information about contraception. 170 It is at least
arguable that the government should be required to use an absti-
nence-only program that does not infringe on parental rights even if it
is not the most effective program possible.
This analysis would be different if, instead of a diffuse govern-
mental interest, the inquiry was focused on the child's right to access
to this potentially life-saving knowledge. The child's due process
rights to life and health171 and First Amendment right to free
speech 172 would be more compelling than the government's immedi-
ate interest in spending less money on public health for minors. How-
ever, under the model suggested by parental rights reformers, this
balancing would not take place. Thus, although one might reasonably
assume that a child would choose the most effective sex education
program in the interests of his or her health, this choice would not be
honored under the reformers' model.
The reforms also would affect other areas of the law. In a de-
tailed critique of the PRRA, Barbara Woodhouse argues that the bill
would tip the balance against intervention in child abuse cases and
freeze the meaning of abuse and neglect in their "traditional"
forms. 73 She also argues that the bill would force public institutions
such as schools to enforce parental values on children instead of pro-
viding a common marketplace of information. 174
IV. Proposals from Academia to Limit Parental Rights
While conservative political forces push for an extension of pa-
rental rights, a number of voices in academia have called for parental
rights to be curtailed. Many scholars propose legal regimes focused
on identifying and satisfying the interests and rights of children.
Power over children would flow from the state as sovereign, which
would in turn delegate responsibility to parents subject to oversight.
One example of this argument can be found in a recent article in
the California Law Review by James Dwyer. 175Dwyer proposes that
the state should grant parents only the "privilege" (as opposed to the
170. Luciana Lagana & David M. Hayes, Contraceptive Health Programs for Adoles-
cents: A Critical Review, 28 ADOLESCENCE 347, 355 (1993).
171. See, e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488, 504-05
(W.D. Wash. 1967), affd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (upholding a Washington state statute which
mandates emergency blood transfusions for minor children over their parents' objections).
172. See, e.g., Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Bd. of Educ., 124 Cal.
Rptr. 68, 90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (finding that parental censorship of safe sex programs in
schools "contract[s] the spectrum of available knowledge," contravening the First
Amendment).
173. See Woodhouse, A Public Role in the Private Family, supra note 11, at 407-11.
174. See id. at 411-13.
175. See Dwyer, supra note 53, at 1436-37.
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"right") to care for and raise their children, and the responsibility to
ensure the protection of their temporal interests. 176 He argues that if
parents' rights were eliminated the state would be unlikely to inter-
vene in the family except in extreme cases involving the child's basic
needs.177 In those cases, the parent could act as agent for the child's
right against unnecessary and disruptive interference and press a claim
on the child's behalf against the state.17 8 Dwyer would also impute to
children a desire that their parents not be "embattled" by the state so
that their parents can feel "competent and empowered.' 79 Switching
to a "privilege/responsibility" format would have the salutary effect of
making parents recognize their children as autonomous individuals
with their own views and life goals.180
Another scholar, Barbara Woodhouse, comes to a similar conclu-
sion through a feminist analysis of the issue. Woodhouse uses the
term "generism" to describe her ideal child-centered legal regime:' 8'
Justice across generations, or generism, calls for a metaphor of dy-
namic stewardship, in which power over children is conferred by the
community, with children's interests and their emerging capacities
the foremost consideration. Stewardship must be earned through
actual care giving, and lost if not exercised with responsibility.
Generism would place children, not adults, firmly at the center and
take as its central values not adult individualism, possession, and
autonomy, as embodied in parental rights, nor even the dyadic inti-
macy of parent/child relationships.' 8 2
Woodhouse argues that family law is still mired in the nineteenth
century paradigm of family ownership by the patriarchal male. 8 3 By
recognizing parental rights, the state renders children the equivalent
of property, inevitably denying them their inherent personhood. 84
Given the inherent weakness of children in the parent/child relation-
ship, Woodhouse argues that protection of the parents from the state
must be sacrificed in order to protect the true interests of children. 8 5
Woodhouse's generism model "would view obligation as a corollary of
procreation" 186 and would dole out authority to parents as earned
through effective stewardship. 187
176. Id.
177. See id. at 1438.
178. See id.
179. Id. at 1434 n.267.
180. See id. at 1440-41.
181. See Barbara B. Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on
Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1747, 1814-15 (1993) [hereinafter Hatching the Egg].
182. Id.
183. Id. See also Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child?, supra note 11, at 1001.
184. See Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child?, supra note 11, at 1048.
185. See Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg, supra note 181, at 1816.
186. See id. at 1818-19.
187. Id.
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Taking an even more explicit stance in favor of state intervention,
another scholar, Howard Eisenberg suggests that the state sponsor
and administer mandatory parent training and parenting examinations
as one of several prerequisites for a license to have custody of a
child.188 Eisenberg notes that those advocating parental rights fre-
quently frame the issue as what is in the long-term best interests of the
child.189 Certainly this has been true for the current wave of national
reform.190 Yet, Eisenberg argues, many parents have failed in impor-
tant ways to provide the necessary discipline, care, and financial sup-
port for their children.' 91 Eisenberg notes the dramatic recent
increase in single-parent families, "crack babies," and the rise in fami-
lies relying on government medical and financial assistance pro-
grams.' 92 He also points to increasing reports of child abuse, neglect,
and the rise in teenage crime and suicide as results of parental
failure.193
To remedy these problems, Eisenberg describes a plan whereby
all potential parents would receive mandatory training in the basics of
how to raise children, including dispute resolution, problem solving,
child bathing, nutrition, safety, and money management. 194 The state
would inculcate values rejecting violence, exploitation of weaker peo-
ple, drug use, and other undesirable behaviors. 95 In addition to pass-
ing two exams on these topics, parents would be required to submit a
child support plan showing that they will be financially able to support
the child within one year of birth.196 A number of factors would serve
as presumptive bars to receiving this license, including failure to pro-
vide court-ordered child support, a history of violence, and use or sale
of drugs.197
188. See Eisenberg, supra note 165, at 1434-38.
189. See id. at 1429.
190. "America's parents are in a far better position than the government to know [the]
needs of their children and to respond to those needs. The parental rights debate boils
down to this: Who decides what's in the best interest of children? Parents or the govern-
ment?" Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 1946 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995) (statement of Greg D. Erken, Executive Director, Of the People). "Colleagues,
children do have rights. They have the right to grow up in a loving, safe home with their
parents. They have the right to receive the discipline, religious and moral beliefs, medical
attention and education that their parents-those responsible adults like you and me-
who know them best and love them most, choose in order to make them the persons they
are meant to be." Id. (statement of Rep. Mike Parker).
191. See Eisenberg, supra note 165, at 1429-34.
192. See id. at 1417-21.
193. See id. at 1421-25.
194. See icL at 1434-37.
195. See icL
196. See id. at 1437-39.
197. See id. at 1438.
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All three of these proposals recognize that a child cannot ade-
quately protect his or her own rights if the state is unable to interfere
with parents' authority. Dwyer's innovation of a child's right to an
undisturbed family has the additional advantage of providing some
protection from excessive governmental intervention in family afffairs.
However, all of these plans imbue the state with the major power
to define and control the shape of the parent-child relationship. This
would open the doors of the family home that the Supreme Court has
been trying to close to government interference since Meyer and
Pierce and would cause a major backslide in the modem right of asso-
ciational privacy begun in Griswold.198 While it is certainly true that
parents dominate the power dynamic in their relationships with their
children, as Woodhouse points out, this power imbalance should not
serve as a justification to extinguish parents' rights. The Supreme
Court has been fashioning in the freedom of association a realm of
autonomy from state intervention in personal relationships that is at
least as powerful, if not more powerful, than similar protection for
political association.199 It would be impossible to maintain a logically
ordered freedom of association if parents, as a kind of disfavored
class, were not allowed protection for what may be their most intimate
and important human relationship-their bond with their child. Just
as individual adults have the privacy right to form sexual relationships
between themselves, and to decide whether and when to become par-
ents through the use of contraception,2°° parents deserve to maintain
their particular kind of intimate relationship with their children. In
the next Part, this Note argues that it is possible to protect the basis of
198. Dwyer does not contend that his model is consistent with Supreme Court deci-
sions in Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder. See Dwyer, supra note 53, at 1379-88. Similarly, Wood-
house makes clear that she is arguing for a fundamental change in the legal system. See
Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg, supra note 181, at 1816. Eisenberg, valiantly, does argue
that his plan is supported under current constitutional law. He concedes that Meyer and
Pierce created a fundamental parental right to raise their children. See Eisenberg, supra
note 165, at 1446. He argues convincingly that his plan comes out of the government's
compelling interest in healthy, well-educated children who do not act in anti-social ways.
Id. at 1447. However, he also maintains that the plan is a narrowly tailored regulatory
scheme to achieve that interest. Id. at 1446-47. Short of the dictatorial regime portrayed
by BRAvn NEw WORLD, supra note 1, it is difficult to imagine any scheme more intrusive
than Eisenberg's. Eisenberg allows the government to define what a good parent is and
does, and creates a constant risk of the loss of custody not just for abuse or neglect but also
for such weaknesses as drug use, lack of financial planning, and mental illness. Eisenberg,
supra note 165, at 1438. This intense social engineering is inimical to Americans' distrust-
ful relationship to government.
199. See Kenneth Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L. J. 624, 626-
29 (1980).
200. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding that non-married
couples have the right to receive and use contraceptives).
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parents' relationships with their children without abdicating state re-
sponsibility for supporting children's rights and interests.
V. The Case for an Associational Parental Right
As described in Part I, the Supreme Court has consistently re-
ferred to the need for government to respect familial boundaries and
the position of parents. Almost all lower court cases interpreting the
Supreme Court's pronouncements have agreed that there is some pro-
tectible liberty interest in the due process clause for the parental right
to direct the upbringing of their children.2 1 Because of this, it would
seem "late in the day" 202-seventy-three years after Meyer was de-
cided-to completely take away parental rights, as scholars such as
Dwyer, Eisenberg, and Woodhouse have proposed.20 3 This would, in
any case, damage the modem constitutional framework of privacy
rights protecting individuals from the state. On the other hand, the
near-absolute protection of parental rights urged by the Christian
Right goes beyond what the Court has been willing to do (especially
in the realm of education). Moreover, it would inevitably result in the
degradation of the fundamental rights of children. This Note pro-
poses a compromise similar to that offered by the Third Circuit in
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital.2° Rather than ac-
cording parental rights an "intermediate" level of scrutiny,20 5 this
Note defines the scope of the right so that it fits more comfortably
into the context of modem privacy cases.
The concept of parental rights has been incorporated into the
modem right to privacy. In Griswold v. Connecticut,20 6 Justice Doug-
las' majority opinion described Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Soci-
ety of Sisters as part of the First Amendment's "penumbra" of
associational privacy. 207 These penumbral rights ensured that the spe-
cific rights stated in the Bill of Rights would remain secure.208 The
right to privacy was also held to be supported by "emanations" from
the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.209 In Roe v. Wade,21 0 Jus-
tice Blackmun noted that the Court had recognized that "a right of
201. See supra Part II.
202. Cf United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1642 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(using these words to express his regret over the barrier of stare decisis to total reforma-
tion of Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
203. See supra Part IV.
204. See supra Part II.
205. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
206. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (declaring the right of a married couple to receive and
use contraceptive devices).
207. Id. at 482.
208. See id
209. See id. at 484.
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personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy
does exist in the Constitution. '21 1 This right of privacy had its "roots"
in the amendments cited by Justice Douglas. He also cited Meyer and
Pierce, finding them (more correctly, as argued in Part I above) to
involve the Fourteenth Amendment.212 The right to privacy spans
several amendments and has an identity of its own.
In his seminal article on associational rights, Kenneth Karst criti-
cizes the "right to privacy" label, which he attributes to Justice Doug-
las's unwillingness in Griswold to invoke the Lochner-tarnished Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.213 Instead, he argues
that the freedoms surrounding procreation and family life recognized
by the Supreme Court should be understood as establishing the free-
dom of intimate association; Karst defines this freedom as "a close
and familiar personal relationship with another that is in some signifi-
cant way comparable to a marriage or family relationship. '21 4 This
freedom extends to marriage and marriage-like relationships as well
as families and alternative families and the relationship between par-
ents and children. 215 Choice is the operative core of freedom of asso-
ciation.216 Individuals who freely bind themselves together into units
such as a family come to expect, on a moral level, that this relationship
will lead to a particular kind of treatment and support.217 This private
expectation has been largely accommodated by the law.218 The choice
itself is protected, even, Karst asserts, when it is exercised by an older
child to be free from parental control.219 But, for Karst, this choice
does not extend to "young children" and he approvingly cites the
"common sense" presumption of parental authority in Parham v.
This concession to parental authority significantly and unnecessa-
rily weakens Karst's thesis. Certainly, children are not capable of ma-
ture judgment in all or even many situations involving their long-term
interests. Yet the Court has consistently held that children are "per-
sons" under the Due Process Clause and possess fundamental rights
210. 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (declaring a woman's right to procure an abortion subject
to government intervention after the first trimester of pregnancy).
211. Id. at 152.
212. Id.
213. Karst, supra note 199, at 664.
214. Id. at 629.
215. See id. at 629.
216. See id. at 637.
217. See id. at 648.
218. Id.
219. See id. at 644.
220. Id. at 644, 645.
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like their adult counterparts. 22 1 How can these rights be accommo-
dated without foolishly putting children in the driver's seat before
they can see over the wheel? As James Dwyer noted, the law has
historically been able to accommodate this dilemma in the context of
parents of mentally and otherwise legally incompetent adults.222 For
instance, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the
Court dismissed the notion that the parents of an adult daughter who
had fallen into a persistent vegetative state should be able to substi-
tute their decision to terminate life support for their adult daugh-
ter's.223 Instead, the Court upheld the state statutory requirement
that an incompetent's wishes for the withdrawal of life support be
shown by clear and convincing evidence. The Court dismissed the
parents' claims that their judgment be given deference and refused to
indulge the presumption that they spoke for their daughter.22 4
Similarly in the case of mentally retarded adults, state law has not
allowed parents to have final authority over medical decisions regard-
ing their adult children, despite the fact that their children may never
be able to make mature decisions on their own.22 Instead courts have
used a "substituted-judgment" procedure to divine what the incompe-
tent adult's decision would have been, were s/he able to form one.22 6
Dwyer argues that this same substituted-judgment could be used for
all unemancipated minor children. The courts should impute to chil-
dren the wish to protect their "temporal interests," including medical
care, protection from adult infliction of physical, psychological, or
emotional trauma, and an adequate and broad-scoped education.227
Dwyer argues that any focus on parental rights obscures the
rights of children.228 Instead he proposes that governmental interven-
tion will be avoided by focusing on the child's right to have family
integrity, and parents who do not feel harassed.22 9 This backdoor pro-
tection of parental interests does not go far enough to recognize the
value and importance of the relationship from the parents' standpoint.
Parents are not simply custodians; they form strong and overriding
221. "Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when
one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by
the Constitution and possess constitutional rights." Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 74 (1976), quoted in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 627 (1979) (Brennan, J. dissent-
ing) (citations omitted).
222. See Dwyer, supra note 53, at 1415-19.
223. 497 U.S. 261, 285-87 (1990).
224. See id. at 281-82.
225. See Dwyer, supra note 53, at 1419.
226. Id. at 1420 (citing In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712,721 (Mass. 1982)) (finding it permis-
sible for a court to use objective criteria in divining an incompetent's wishes).
227. Id. at 1432.
228. See id at 1436.
229. See id. at 1432.
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relationships with their children that are, in many ways, incomparably
more important to these individuals than any other relationship.230
The parent-child relationship shares many aspects with other relation-
ships protected under the freedom of association (such as marriage
and non-marital sexual relationships) including love, caring, financial,
and other types of support. However, parenting is unique in that it
necessarily involves teaching, control, discipline, and authority as well.
It is not a professional custodian-type relationship. Because parents
are not behavioral scientists or professional custodians, there is no
"goal" to their relationship with their children (for example, that their
children grow up healthy, well-educated, and well-prepared for partic-
ipation in society), no matter how fervently most parents and the state
desire a particular result. The relationship is itself a separate good
that transcends these ends, both for the parent who receives personal
enrichment through sharing with his or her children, and for the child
who desires and needs parental affection and care-not just for suffi-
cient mental health to participate in democratic polity later in life-but
because that attention itself is part of the creation of the child as a
person.231
The fact that this relationship is valuable, however, does not
mean that parents should have plenary authority. Such authority has
already been clearly rejected by the courts in situations of abuse,232 in
mandatory schooling,233 and in requirements that parents obtain
emergency medical treatment for their children.2 -4 In order to accom-
modate the fundamental rights and the interests of both children and
society, parental rights must be tempered. Parental rights advocates
argue that this should be done by allowing the government to override
any parental decisions only when it has a compelling interest and does
so in a way that is narrowly tailored to that interest2 35 A better way is
230. "For many years, I was a practicing child clinical psychologist. During that time, I
treated many clients and was relatively successful. I like to believe that my clients saw me
as a caring and committed professional. But I would not have voluntarily died for even
one of my patients. In contrast, I would, quite literally and without hesitation, die for my
children. And so would most parents." Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act of 1995;
Hearings on H.R. 1946 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Judiciary
Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Wade F. Horn, Director of the National
Fatherhood Initiative).
231. See JOSEPH GoLDsTEIN ET. AL, BEYOND THE BEST INTEREs OF THE CMLD 17-
20 (1979) (describing how relationships with parents "form the base from which any fur-
ther relationships develop").
232. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 630 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
233. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (finding that the state can
require that children of certain ages receive schooling).
234. See Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488,504 (W.D. Wash.
1967), affd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (upholding, over parents' objections, a statute making
blood transfusions mandatory in emergency situations).
235. See supra notes 136-139 and accompanying text.
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to focus on the relationship itself. A fundamental associational paren-
tal right should be recognized such that the state would have to show a
compelling interest when its intrusions substantially undermine that
relationship. So, to borrow from the analytical format suggested by
the PRRA,236 the burden would first be on the parent to show that the
particular governmental intervention has substantially impaired his or
her relationship with the child. The burden would then shift to the
government to prove that the intrusion sprang from a compelling in-
terest and was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. While many
governmental actions infringe on parental decisions, few can be seri-
ously argued to do so to such an extent that the relationship between
parent and child is damaged.117
This relationship-centered, associational approach would retain
the advantage of Dwyer's parental privilege/responsibility model and
Woodhouse's generism model in allowing breathing room for the pro-
tection of children's fundamental rights. Instead of the child's right
being pitted against a parental right to make nearly any decision for
any reason, it would be balanced against the parent's right to maintain
a parental relationship (which must include guidance and discipline)
in general. An obedient child need not obey a parent's every whim.
But where, in cases such as the parental testing and licensing scheme
suggested by Eisenberg, a state intervention dramatically impacts the
nature of the parent's authoritative relationship with the child, the
state would have to prove it had more than just a legitimate interest in
the child's well-being. Certainly, parents should not have to wait for
anything as extreme as Eisenberg's plan to invoke their right. For in-
stance, if a state were to require public schooling for all children to the
exclusion of private and home schooling, as Oregon did in 1925,23 8
parents could credibly argue that removing all educational alterna-
tives undermines their authoritative relationship with their children.
This associational model can be reconciled more easily with mod-
em Supreme Court precedent. In Griswold and its progeny, the Court
has recognized a sphere of individual privacy, arguably focused on the
intimate relationships between individuals. 239 An associational paren-
tal right is consistent with the right to choose whether or when to be-
come a parent, and the right to maintain committed marital and
marriage-like relationships. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court held
that the state's requirement that all children attend school until the
eighth grade infringed on the religious way of life of the Old Amish
236. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
237. For an example of how this inquiry would work in practice, see infra notes 234-237
and accompanying text.
238. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
239. See Karst, supra note 199, at 634.
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Order parents.240 The worldly knowledge gained in school and the
enforced physical separation of children from the community during
school hours undermined their entire approach to parenting and rais-
ing their children.241 As discussed in Section I, above, the Yoder
Court relied in large part on the First Amendment free exercise right
of the parents. In Employment Division v. Smith, Justice Scalia inter-
preted the Amish parents' claim in Yoder (in passing) as a combina-
tion of constitutional rights (there, privacy and free exercise) that
created a more powerful right.2 42 To be more consistent with the asso-
ciational model, Yoder should be interpreted more narrowly to mean
that a parental rights claim is a necessary but not sufficient element of
a religion-based claim by a parent. In order to make out a colorable
claim that a parent's free exercise rights have been infringed, the par-
ent must first show that the state action has infringed on the parent-
child relationship. This was arguably the approach taken by the First
Circuit Court of Appeals in Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Produc-
tions.243 This would make sense in terms of standing for a First
Amendment claim: parents, of course, may sue as agents of their chil-
dren and press their children's free exercise claims. 244 However, a
claim that the parents' free exercise rights have been violated is neces-
sarily dependent on the relationship between parent and child.245
The associational model runs afoul of language in Parham v. J.R.,
which discussed the Court's wish to presume that parents act in the
best interests of their children and urged that their decisions be given
deference.2 46 Nevertheless, the Parham Court also carefully balanced
children's fundamental right to be free of bodily restraint and the
state's interests in discouraging useless institutionalization against the
parents' interests in the commitment process. The Court found that a
psychologist's professional but informal review of "voluntary" com-
mitment of children was sufficient to guarantee that children's rights
240. 406 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1972).
241. See id.
242. See 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
243. 68 F.3d 525 (1995), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 1044 (1996).
244. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (discussing the requirements for
standing).
245. In the federal courts, for example, one of the requirements in order to have a
justiciable claim under the doctrine of standing is that the claimant demonstrate that s/he
personally sustained an injury, that the injury is fairly traceable to the event/defendant and
that it is redressible through the courts. See generally ERWIN CHEMERiNSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICrnON 53-101 (2d ed. 1994). The only way a parent could show that she personally
sustained injury by, for instance, the fact that her child was forced to attend a safe sex
presentation at school, would be to argue that making decisions about her child's exposure
to sex-related information involves her rights as a parent. Thus, the parent cannot make
out a claim (at least under the federal rules) of a violation of free exercise rights without
implicating parental rights.
246. 442 U.S. 584, 601 (1979). See also supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
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and society's interests were taken into account.247 In light of the logic
of the Griswold privacy cases and Yoder, it would be reasonable to
interpret the holding of Parham narrowly, to mean only that in the
case of commitment to mental institutions, a child's fundamental right
to liberty is sufficiently protected by a psychologist's review (as op-
posed to an adversary hearing). Thus the parents' role, though "sub-
stantial" in that they are empowered to begin the process of
commitment, is not determinative, because it is the psychologist who
makes a medical decision for a possibly mentally ill child. Thus the
issue in Parham could be seen as regarding the limits of children's
rights (as opposed to adults in the same situation) rather than an ex-
pansion of parents' rights.
The operation of the associational model of parental rights might
be illustrated using the Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Productions248
example as described in Part HI, above. Under the associational pa-
rental right model advocated in this Note, the parents in Brown would
first have to prove that the state intervention, here the mandatory as-
sembly, had substantially impaired their parent-child relationship. In
that case, there was a one-time presentation on safe sex with graphic
language and potentially offensive humor. The performer presented
sexual information laced with attention-getting humor. This would
not seem to seriously undermine parents' position of authority and
teaching role in their children's understanding of appropriate sexual
behavior. However, one of the parents' claims was that the speaker
"advocated and approved oral sex, masturbation, homosexual sexual
activity, and condom use during promiscuous premarital sex." 249 If
the speaker went beyond information-sharing to a kind of values
training, urging the children in effect to reject their parents' admoni-
tions about premarital sex, a more plausible argument could be made
that a conscious attempt to undermine the authority of the parents
was being made. The focus, though, is on the relationship itself, so it
would require that the children actually be affected by the presenta-
tion in such a way that their relationship with their parents was im-
paired. Determining whether the children were affected and the
effect on the parent-child relationship would be a task for the fact
finder. Given that the children in this case were fully participatory
parties in the lawsuit, challenging with their parents a presentation
they claimed "humiliated and intimidated"5 0 them, it seems unlikely
that they took the presenter's suggestions so much to heart that it af-
fected their relationship with their parents. If it were found that the
247. Parham, 442 U.S. at 607.
248. 68 F.3d 525, 533 n.5 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1044 (1996).
249. Id. at 528.
250. Id.
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presentation had such an effect on the parent-child relationship, then
the burden would shift to the school to prove that the program was
narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling government interest.251
Through this balancing, the school would be forced to be respectful of
the underlying nature of the parent-child relationship. However, par-
ents would not be able to dictate all of the details of school curricula
to precisely accord with their own values and ideas.
Conclusion
With the rise of parental rights as a significant political as well as
legal issue, the likelihood of substantial changes in this area of the law
is rapidly increasing. Existing Supreme Court precedent on the exist-
ence and scope of parental rights is ambiguous and has led to some
confusion in the lower courts. However, consistent treatment of pa-
rental rights can be accomplished by placing parental rights within the
greater context of the right to privacy and intimate association. This
Note has advocated that parents be taken seriously and that their rela-
tionships with their children be honored and protected at least to the
same degree that other intimate relationships have been. Like other
protected relationships, however, this does not and should not trans-
late into the plenary right to control the other party, to the extinguish-
ment of that party's rights. An associational model of parental rights
would provide a bulwark against extreme governmental intervention
in family life but not shut the door entirely on society's legitimate con-
cern for the rearing of children.
251. This case, like Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972), does not seem to
present a situation in which the parents' and children's rights clash. If the parents had
sought injunctive relief against such a safe sex program over their children's objections
before it was shown to their children, then the Court should engage in the balancing test
created by Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599 (1979). The parents' right would be located in
the nature and change of the relationship. The children's right would be based not only on
First Amendment free speech grounds (the right to receive information), but arguably also
a due process right to receive life-saving information that has been prepared especially for
them. If the government were to deny the children the ability to hear the presentation
shown to their classmates about how to protect themselves from sexually-transmitted dis-
eases such as AIDS on the basis of their parents' objections, this might endanger their
lives, violating the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of "life, liberty and property" (em-
phasis added). In balancing the importance of parental authority with children's health, a
determination about the effectiveness and necessity of sex education would be necessary.
This would also be relevant to the third inquiry-the government's interest.
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